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Abstract
Background: Food regulatory bodies play an important role in public health, and in reducing the costs of food
borne illness that are absorbed by both industry and government. Regulation in the food industry involves a
relationship between regulators and members of the industry, and it is imperative that these relationships are built
on trust. Research has shown in a variety of contexts that businesses find the most success when there are high
levels of trust between them and their key stakeholders. An evidence-based understanding of the barriers to
communication and trust is imperative if we are to put forward recommendations for facilitating the (re)building
of trusting and communicative relationships.
Methods: We present data from 72 interviews with regulators and industry representatives regarding their trust in
and communication with one another. Interviews were conducted in the UK, New Zealand, and Australia in 2013.
Results: Data identify a variety of factors that shape the dynamic and complex relationships between regulators
and industry, as well as barriers to communication and trust between the two parties. Novel in our approach is
our emphasis on identifying solutions to these barriers from the voices of industry and regulators.
Conclusions: We provide recommendations (e.g., development of industry advisory boards) to facilitate the (re)
building of trusting and communicative relationships between the two parties.
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Background
Food regulatory bodies play an important role in the
field of public health, and contribute significantly to the
health of populations in a variety of ways [1]. In particu-
lar, their role involves both developing food safety stan-
dards, and/or enforcing these standards to monitor food
safety risks. There are two main types of food risks for
consumers. The first relates to hygiene and is specific to
foods being unsafe for consumers to consume. The
second relates to food standards which includes nutrition
labelling (e.g., consumers are misled over fat content),
safety labelling (e.g., use by dates are incorrect), and com-
position labelling (e.g., labelling misleads the consumer
because contents do not meet compositional standards)
[2]. As such, food safety risks refer to those that directly
affect human health, but also risks regarded as “food fraud
incidents”, relating to deception or malintent [3]. As a
result, the role of food regulators is broad and can range
from enforcing food standards in restaurants to organising
large scale food recalls. Regardless of role, food regulation
is essential for ensuring public safety as well as developing
and maintaining public trust in food [4].
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Enforcement involves engagement with members of the
food industry who are required to comply with such
standards, with penalties occurring if noncompliance is
identified. Food safety incidents, for example Garibaldi
(Australia), bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)
(UK) and toxic levels of iodine (New Zealand) [5–7] have
brought to light the importance of regulation of the food
industry [8, 9]. The costs associated with foodborne illness
are important for both regulators and industry. Using
Australia as an example, an estimated 4.1 million domes-
tically acquired cases of foodborne gastroenteritis occur
annually, costing an estimated $1.2 billion AUD per year
[10]. These costs are absorbed by a variety of actors with a
stake in food safety, including businesses (food safety
recall costs total $14 million AUD) and the Australian
government ($10 million AUD) [11]. As such, both regula-
tors and members of industry have a stake in maintaining
food safety standards and avoiding food scares.
Regulation in the food industry involves a relationship
between regulators and members of the industry, and it
is imperative that these relationships are built on trust.
At its core, trust is described by social theorists as exist-
ing in three parts: A trusts B to do X [12, 13]. In this
context, A and B are the regulators and members of
industry, and “doing X” (either A for B, or B for A) can
be described as acting in each other’s best interests. No
matter the industry, trust has been shown to play a very
important role in regulation-industry relationships, en-
hancing cooperation and leading to better outcomes for
both parties [14]. Research has shown in a variety of
contexts that businesses find the most success when
there are high levels of trust between them and their key
stakeholders [15]. Indeed, it is in the best interest that
the two parties cooperate. Industry’s trust in regulation,
and subsequent compliance with food safety standards
may minimize food safety incidents that have the poten-
tial to reduce consumer trust, reducing their profits. For
regulators, having a trusting relationship with industry
may lead to greater transparency in times of food scares
or when industry are finding it challenging to meet food
safety standards.
Trust is a complex multidimensional concept consist-
ing of both a rational component (arising from experi-
ence) and an irrational component based on instinct and
emotion [16, 17]. Importantly, trust can be understood
to occur at two distinct levels – institutional [18] and
interpersonal [19]. Institutional trust is that which is
placed in one or more social systems or institutions (e.g.,
Food Standards Australia New Zealand). Interpersonal
trust is negotiated between individuals; for example,
between a consumer and a grocer. Both forms of trust
are important for understanding where and how trust
can be (re)developed and maintained in the context of food
safety regulation and compliance. Both the reputation and
knowledge of the institution (e.g., Food Standards Agency
or McDonalds), as well as the personal relationships with
those who represent it (Food Safety Manager or Restaurant
Owner), are vital to the pursuit of trust between members
of industry and regulators.
The relationship between regulators and industry can
be complicated by a variety of factors, including the
varying sizes of businesses involved, as they can range
from multinational corporations to small, family-owned
businesses [20]. Therefore, it is important to recognise
both the perceived and real barriers that the food industry
face when aiming to comply with food safety standards,
and the level of understanding of these challenges from
the perspective of regulators. An evidence-based under-
standing of the barriers to communication and trust is
imperative if we are to put forward recommendations for
facilitating the (re)building of trusting and communicative
relationships with the aim of increasing compliance in the
interest of public health.
This paper presents the views of regulators and members
of industry regarding their trust in and communication
with one another within three countries (UK, New Zealand,
and Australia), which necessities a brief overview of the
policy and institutional context within each locale. Food
Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) is a bi-national
body that is responsible for the Australia New Zealand
Food Standards Code which forms the basis of much of the
food law in each country. FSANZ is an independent
science-based organization that is managed by a Board
whose members are experts in various aspects of food (e.g.,
toxicology, nutrition, microbiology, food technology, food
industry etc.). FSANZ is not responsible for the enforce-
ment of the Code, nor is it responsible for the policy that
informs the direction of the Code – this is undertaken by
the states and territories of Australia, and the Government
of New Zealand. In the case of policy this is generally the
departments of health and/or agriculture, while enforce-
ment may be undertaken by local authorities. In the UK,
the Food Standards Agency is generally responsible for the
development of food safety policy and controls, while
enforcement of these are devolved to local authorities. In
England the nutrition components of food regulation are
administered through the Department of Health.
For the purposes of this paper, the use of the term
regulator is inclusive of both individuals responsible for
developing food safety standards and for enforcing food
safety standards. The term industry is inclusive of a
variety of individuals and organisation types (e.g., grocers,
small business owners, and large corporations). Our
analysis of these perspectives has allowed us to identify
barriers and facilitators to communication and trust, and
potential areas of conflict that are problematic from a
public health perspective that may be amenable to change.
A variety of data-driven solutions are provided for
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(re)building trusting and communicative relationships
between the two parties, with the end goal of protect-
ing the public.
Methods
Study
The data presented in this in this paper comes from a
larger study examining trust in the food system from the
perspectives of food regulators, the food industry and the
media, conducted across three countries – UK, New
Zealand (NZ) and Australia (AU). A protocol paper out-
lining this wider study has been published elsewhere [20].
Recruitment
Individuals working in the food regulation and food in-
dustry were recruited for this research. Recruitment was
through purposive sampling, which enabled participation
of individuals who were information rich [21] and had
relevant experiences to share [22]. An initial list of
people to contact was developed by the research team,
based on their own contacts and knowledge of food
industry and regulatory settings. Considering the varied
roles of representatives working in the food regulation
settings, a sampling strategy was developed to ensure
coverage of participants working in different areas
including policy development, standards setting, imple-
mentation, inspection and enforcement. Likewise, the
sampling strategy for industry was developed to ensure
coverage of a range of business types including local
food industry, franchise food industry, supermarkets, in-
dustry advocacy groups and consumer advocacy groups.
Potential participants and organisations were contacted
by one researcher in AU and NZ and two researchers in
the UK. Initial contact was made through e-mail. If no
response was received, a second email was sent and this
was followed up by a phone call if a response to the sec-
ond email was not received. In total, 80 individuals were
contacted. Eight declined participation or did not respond
to requests for participation. The email/ phone call out-
lined the purpose of the study and invited the individual
to participate in an interview. An information sheet and
letter of introduction was also included. Table 1 provides
an overview of the participant sample.
As noted above, the actors within the food industry, as
well as regulation vary, which is an important consider-
ation in the interpretation of the results. Table 2 provides
an overview of participant characteristics as they relate to
the participant’s role within regulation or industry.
Data collection
Data were collected using semi-structured interviews.
The interview guide was piloted separately in the UK,
NZ and AU to check for usability and relevance to the
cultural context. Minor changes were made to increase
flow of the interview schedule based on feedback from
piloting. The interview schedule was used as a guide for
discussion during interviews. Relevant to this paper, the
interview guide was designed to discuss food regulator
and food industry representatives’ ideas about food
safety, responses to food incidents in general, regulation
and maintaining safety standards, as well as challenges
to compliance with food regulation. The interview guide
has been published elsewhere [23].
Interviews were conducted face-to-face or over the
telephone at a time and location convenient for the
participant. Phone interviews were used when partici-
pants were geographically distant from the interviewers.
Interviews ranged from 30-60 min. Three interviewers
collected data, one in Australia and NZ and two in the
UK. The three interviewers met fortnightly via Skype
during the data collection period to ensure consistency
in questioning. Interviews were conducted in AU and
the UK between July and November 2013 and in NZ in
October 2013 until saturation of themes was reached
[24]. Interviews were digitally recorded using a voice re-
corder after consent to conduct the interview had been
obtained.
Data analysis
Digital voice files were de-identified and transcribed
verbatim. In this study, nonverbal cues, emphasis and
pace were deemed less important and were not
transcribed. Interview transcripts were checked by
each interviewer for accuracy. De-identified tran-
scripts were then imported into NVivo 10.0 (QSR
International, Doncaster). A start list of codes was
developed by the research team (including academics
and industry partners working in the food regulation
setting). Transcripts were then coded by one re-
searcher using this start list of codes following six
stages of thematic analysis [25]. Central to this paper
are the codes developed from the research objectives
that included role of interviewees in regulation, indus-
try and maintaining safety standards. As coding
progressed, further themes and sub-themes were
added based on the objectives of the research and in-
formation in the data. Coding was checked and
agreed upon by team members at fortnightly team
meetings and at two data analysis workshops during
the data analysis phase of the research. Other mem-
bers of the research team reviewed up to five tran-
scripts each to confirm the themes arising from the
primary researcher’s analysis.
Table 1 Participant sample
UniteUKd Kingdom New Zealand Australia
Industry: N = 14 Industry: N = 4 Industry: N = 11
Regulator: N = 11 Regulator: N = 6 Regulator: N = 26
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Results1
Regulators
The two themes identified in interviews with regulators
related to their role in engagement with the food indus-
try, and conflict and understanding in their relationships
with industry. Not surprisingly, the regulator voices
across all three countries represented below are from
what we have categorized as ‘state-based food regulation’
(see Table 2), while those in the national food regulatory
bodies did not comment on their engagement with the
food industry. This is likely because it is the state-based
regulators who are responsible for the enforcement of
the code and therefore have ongoing personal engage-
ment with members of industry.
Perception of role in engagement with food industry
Participants across all three countries discussed their
role in food safety, and their relationship with industry.
There were clear differences in how AU and NZ
described their roles when compared to UK regulators.
AU and NZ regulators identified their role as devel-
opers or enforcers of regulation, with the primary focus
being public safety. However, they identified conflict
with industry, which they perceived to be a misconcep-
tion on the part of industry that regulators try to cause
problems for industry:
I mean I think we’re all after the same end, like we’re
all there to protect public health, and I think a lot of
the food guys are wanting to do that as well…And,
yeah, we don’t want to be shutting people down, we
really don’t. If we can identify problems we want to go
in and fix them up and I think if that can all be
managed well and the people where a problem might
be identified, if they’re very keen to do the right thing
then often they’re the success stories and they actually
– you know, their businesses go on to be stronger and
stronger and stronger… There’s a perception perhaps
that public health want to close down and anywhere
that’s dirty we don’t want them to operate anymore
and I don’t think that’s the case. (AU-REG23)
The above comment also identifies recognition of the
mutual benefit that can result from compliance with
regulation; public safety and making industry stronger.
NZ-REG1 echoes this, commenting that while regulators
are at times perceived as being the enemy, industry often
do value their recommendations and view them as
strengthening industry. In recognition of the potential to
be viewed as the enemy, the following suggests that NZ
regulators make a concerted effort to ensure their behav-
iours and actions suggest otherwise, and to work with
industry to resolve issues:
Whenever we do – in government we tend to be fairly
cautious because we’re bureaucrats and sometimes –
there’s always a little bit of pushback [from industry];
sometimes there’s quite a bit of pushback. I have to say
quite often companies are on the same page when they
know that their reputation is at risk so quite often the
companies – well, there was one of the companies that
we were dealing with in the incident who said – we said
Table 2 Sample characteristicsa
Sector Description of role Examples of roles Participant IDs
Industry Individuals working at various role in the
restaurant industry
e.g., food and beverage managers, chefs AU-IND: 9-10
Individuals working with industry in the
role of food regulation, or in the role of
consumer advocate, nutrition and
food safety
e.g., consultants in nutrition, food safety,
and regulation
UK-IND: 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13
NZ-IND: 1
AU-IND 1, 11
Individuals involved in the finance and
management of large scale corporations
e.g., director or CEO of food and grocery
councils and multi-million dollar
corporations
UK-IND: 1, 2, 4, 8-10, 12
NZ-IND: 2, 3, 4
AU-INDI: 2, 3, 5, 6-8
Individuals involved in the production or
manufacturing of food
e.g., director of quality assurance UK-IND: 14
AU-IND 4
Regulator Individuals of varying levels of seniority
from national food regulatory bodies
Food regulatory bodies UK-REG: 1, 2, 7-8, 11
NZ-REG: 5
AU-REG: 3-7, 11-12, 14, 18, 25, 26
State-based food regulators State Health Departments UK-REG: 3-6, 9, 10
NZ-REG: 1-4, 6
AU-REG: 1, 2, 8-10, 13, 15-17, 19-24
aIn order to maintain participant confidentiality, we have not provided the specific names of the industry/regulator body within which participants are affiliated.
Rather, we have categorized participants according to their role and job title for the purpose of data interpretation
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‘this is what we think is affected and this is what we
recommend you recall’ and they said ‘we’re not going to
quibble, we’re just going to get rid of the stuff. Anything
that’s potentially affected we’re just going to withdraw
the whole lot’ and the only reason they did that is for
commercial reasons, not for trust reasons and I think
that was the right thing to do. It will have cost them
more money but it was an investment in the brand.
(NZ-REG1)
UK regulators also identified their role as being
responsible for enforcing regulation. However, within
the following quote there is no indication that working
with industry may be beneficial for both parties. The
quote, among others, is indicative of a more top down
approach than identified in NZ and AU interviews:
I think there’s an expectation on their part [industry]
that we’re almost viewed as a consultant in many cases
and we should be providing them with information and
guidance to update their systems when in fact that
responsibility lies with them and they’re duty bound,
or they need to think about who they engage as a
consultant to assist them in their activities. It’s not our
role really; our role is to identify what’s not compliant
and to advise the businesses that they need to address
these issues. You might offer some guidance but our
role is not to recreate or reproduce your
documentation or your procedures or practices, it’s to
make sure that they are correct and advise you of that
and then monitor the activity to see that you’ve
addressed those issues (UK-REG5)
UK regulator interviews demonstrated a clear division
of roles regarding food safety, and little communication
or partnership between industry and regulation.
Perceived influences on regulator-industry communication:
conflict and understanding
Within the UK specifically, regulator interviewees discussed
the reluctance of industry to work with regulators.
For example:
They [industry] have the technical knowledge and we
may not have the knowledge to deal with some of the
stuff because it is quite technical… we have a general
understanding of most stuff and if we want to obtain
particular information we have to go through loads of
regulation and guidance to get that information where
they’re actually doing it all the time. Sometimes you
may walk in and they’ll say ‘well, what do you know?
I know more about this activity than you do’ which
they may do but we will look at it objectively and where
our powers or where our skill comes in is an ability to
audit systems and to look at stuff objectively and make
decisions based on the information that’s provided to
us. (UK-REG5)
In relation to the recent horsemeat scandal in the
UK (2013), the following was stated regarding why
communication might lead to conflict between the
two parties. A clear explanation is given which relates
to the fear of repercussions that may result from
transparency between the two.
I think that at the start there was quite a bit of
reluctance of industry to work with the < name of
regulating body > and that’s sort of quite historic
because they were concerned that if they told < name
of regulating body > things and they admitted they
didn’t do things right they might get punished.
(UK-REG10)
UK regulators identified industry as falling into one of
four groups; dependent on the extent to which they
want to comply with regulation, and the extent to which
they actually do comply with regulation. The perception
is that these different ‘types’ of industry require differential
treatment:
You’ve got those that will know what they need to do
and how they need to do it and will do it proactively;
you’ve got those that want to comply but don’t really
know how to comply and are looking to you for help
and advice; you’ve got businesses that don’t want to
comply but, you know, with a little bit of sort of help
the persuasion will get there. And you’ve got those
that don’t care, don’t want to care, are in it for pure
profit and are trying to avoid the regulation and trying
to avoid being caught making money at the expense
of, well, anything really. (UK-REG3)
Those who are trusted to comply were identified as
requiring less monitoring:
So the likes of Tesco and Sainsbury’s and McDonald’s,
etcetera, you would probably be able to look away from
them because they have got generally very good systems
in place when they’re implemented…leave the likes of
the bigger retailers to their own devices because simply
we knew that they would do their own investigation
and pull this stuff if they found it on their shelves.
(UK-REG3)
However, conflicting with the above quote, the follow-
ing suggest that larger industry (e.g., McDonalds) are
more closely monitored because of the greater impact if
a food incident was to occur. UK-REG3 continues:
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… if you have somewhere that has the potential to
have a bigger impact you visit it more often than you
would somebody that has the potential of a smaller
impact, like a post office selling a few lollies; that
makes common sense. (UK-REG3)
We are unable to explain this inconsistency and
further understanding of the flexibility in monitoring
and enforcement is required.
Whilst also identifying the conflict between regulators
and industry, AU regulators were sympathetic to the fact
that compliance with (over)regulation can be burdensome
and potentially detrimental to business. The following
quote emphasizes the influence that the political economy
has on industry food safety management:
A lot of people don’t want to make – no-one really
wants to make somebody else sick but there are business
imperatives that are pushing some practices, you know,
they need to make money to survive because that’s their
livelihood but also they need to be doing those things in
a safe way that doesn’t make people sick. (AU-REG23)
Industry
Difficulties in compliance
Representatives of industry discussed their difficulties
with compliance in relation to the changing nature
of regulations, the knowledge gap between industry
and regulators, a lack of consistency across regulators, and
concerns about the potential for over-regulation. Not
surprisingly, the majority of the comments regarding
difficulties in compliance were from individuals
whose primary position in industry was the finance
and management of large-scale corporations (see
Table 2).
NZ and AU industry interviewees discussed the difficulty
in abiding by complex and sometimes irrelevant regulations
that are constantly updated and changed, requiring more
work on the part of the industry to get up-to-speed.
We need to be making sure that we produce a
product that is safe and we don’t need to complicate
that. Especially for small producers let’s just keep it
simple. Let’s just make sure that all the criteria is
being met but let’s not overcomplicate it. (AU-IND4)
I think they’re updating the current food standards codes.
I think it’s been challenged that many times that it’s
irrelevant to the industry…Because it’s boring and you
have to read ten pages to get to the results. (AU-IND5)
Contrary to regulator beliefs about their proximity to
and understanding of industry challenges, industry par-
ticipants noted that regulators are too far removed from
the food industry and therefore, do not relate to the bar-
riers to compliance with regulation:
Well, they need to understand food and they can’t
understand food if they don’t understand the food
system that’s providing it, particularly if you’re trying
to protect consumers, which is their fundamental role,
of course. (AU-IND3)
Consistent with comments made by AU industry, UK
interviewees also commented that individuals in regula-
tion do not always have the food expertise required to
make the decisions they are faced with:
I think it’s very important to have an independent
position but you need to work closely because if you
want real expertise and technical guidance, technical
advice, some of that best knowledge sits within the food
chain. You have to find a balance between the two but
independent robustness is very important. (UK-IND9)
They get in wrong but in terms, sometimes, of their
understanding of the industry. You know, a lot of
their expertise has been lost down the years as people
have moved around, gone, and they sometimes seem
to know remarkably little about how the food supply
chains work. (UK-IND13)
This lack of knowledge on the part of regulators was
seen as problematic and in some cases, harmful to busi-
nesses. For example:
I mean the regulators, sometimes they’re not always as
sensitive to the sort of brand issues as food
manufacturers are and they can say something which is
intended for the best but, you know, plays rather badly
in the media and can sometimes make matters worse.
Sometimes I’ve had incidences where they have made
statements in the media which have required retailers
to remove product from shelf completely unnecessarily
because they’ve just said the wrong thing completely
inadvertently because they’re not trained to deal with
the media or they don’t sort of think through what it is
they’re actually saying. (UK-IND12)
Another difficulty faced in complying noted by indus-
try was the lack of what they referred to as ‘consistency’
in enforcement, which in some circumstances suggested
a conflict of interest or differential treatment:
Environmental Health Officers in different council
areas may be administering the law differently – they
need to come together and apply the law in the same
way in order to get a unified approach. (AU-IND2)
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I think also enforcing [regulation] it is quite important
as well. I think one of the things that people get upset
with – you know, again I refer to my friend who
manages a pub – she says ‘oh well I’ve been into
restaurants and I’ve walked past their kitchens and
I’ve seen their kind of messy floors and how come I’m
being pulled up because I didn’t fill in my fridge/
freezer temperature gauge for last week and yet they
had meat on the floor? When I walked past I
could’ – so I think there’s that. (UK-IND4)
Concerns about the extent of regulation, and the potential
effects of regulation on smaller industry were also noted:
Also the cost of manufacture in Australia is ridiculous
with all the red tape. All the requirements that the
government puts in, day in day out, it doesn’t help
local manufacturers. If you’re small it’s really hard
because you’ve got no volume. It’s easier for bigger
players because they can bend the rules in different
ways because they’ve got volume. (AU-IND5)
I think farmers are very fed up with red tape and
bureaucracy. We don’t want to tie people down with
lots of bureaucracy. It makes it harder to run a business
with all that, when you’ve got paperwork and
bureaucracy so I think – I don’t think it’s an issue
of trust, it’s just an issue of focus. So farmers want
their focus to be on driving these businesses forward
not holding them down by red tape and bureaucracy…
regulators in the UK are very – can definitely put a lot
of burden on farmers and that’s not always equal to
other parts of the world which makes it difficult for us
to compete globally. (UK-IND10)
While not a matter of distrust, the above identifies
conflict or a lack of communication between the industry
and regulators, and the perception or reality that regulation
is problematic for business.
Conflict with, and distrust in, regulators
Several participants from NZ and AU industry noted the
importance of trust in their relationship with regulators,
but indicated that trust between the two is not always
present. Among industry representatives, this was largely
attributed to poor communication and engagement by
the regulators, which in turn led to the perception that
regulators are not focused on maintaining public safety,
as intended:
I’m not a big fan of food regulators. I think food
regulators are there to protect corporate industrialized
food systems and not public health and safety. You
don’t have to look very long at the regulatory system
or at the risks that we are exposed to to start to
question the regulatory system and to realize that the
regulatory system is letting us down, letting the public
down and then the consequence of that is you have low
trust in mainstream – a mainstream food system and
the regulatory authorities that oversee that food safety
regulatory systems to be overhauled, completely
overhauled to work on the premise of protecting
public health and safety rather than, as we do at
the moment, protecting industry…. I mean chemicals
used in agriculture, in food production, chemicals used
in food processing, GMOs used in foods, radiation being
used, these are all issues which we believe are being very
poorly assessed. System wide risks that the public
is being exposed to that’s being very poorly assessed for
public health and safety because the regulatory system
is designed to not look at what they don’t want to look
at. It’s designed to hide under the carpet many of the
consequences of the risk that the food industry is using
or technologies that expose the public to risks. Many of
those risks, the regulatory system desire to not look at
those risks. (AU-IND1)
The interviewee here, whose role in industry is food
safety, is not surprisingly focused on ensuring public
safety. Their perception is that regulators focus too much
on protecting selected industry, suggesting that Australian
food regulation is in part at least, driven by the political
agenda. Distinct from the role described by regulators,
their perception is that the safety of the public is not the
primary concern. Similarly, NZ-IND4 discusses their dis-
trust in regulators, but with a different rationalization
which may be related to their role in the finance and man-
agement of industry. The quote suggests that trusting reg-
ulators to take action can have negative implications for
industry when the safety of a product is in question:
It’s not just what the company does, it’s also what the
regulator does and if I look at the < removed for
confidentiality > recall I believe that brand has sustained
some damage through no fault of the company at all,
purely because < name of regulatory body > pressured
into recalling every single batch, its entire brand line,
when in fact there were only specific batches involved;
that said to consumers there’s something wrong with
every product. (NZ-IND4)
UK-IND11, identified as a consumer advocate, also
discussed the fallibility of regulators and the conse-
quences of these alleged mistakes on industry. The
participant is sympathetic to the dual role of regulators
as looking out for consumers but also having to consider
the implications for industry if their actions are overly
cautious:
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The problem I think with regulators is in the Catch
22 where they can take proactive action but if that
means that they, for example, go too early and say to
companies ‘okay, clear the shelves. Those tens of
millions of products, huge amounts of your money,
off the shelves, chuck them away, destroy them; it’s
your profit’ and then it turns out that it wasn’t really a
problem and the regulator had – you know because
there’s always uncertainty about these things, the
regulator had kind of erred on the side of caution, can
cause, you know all kinds of problems and so regulators
aren’t allowed to do that because they have to sort of
pre-empt things but also know for certain. (UK-IND11)
The dual role of the regulator, as advisor to the
consumer and industry, was also identified as a potential
source of conflict with regulators. For example, the case
above identifies regulators as being perhaps overly
cautious for the protection of the consumer, thereby
damaging the industry. Below, NZ-IND1 who is involved
in the finance and management of industry, identifies
the pressure on regulators to serve multiple interests:
I mean food regulators, they can find themselves trying
to serve both consumers and manufacturers. We have
quite a strong push here for export so a lot of focus on
the safety of food exports, so that can mean that the
domestic market is – domestic consumers are less well
served. (NZ-IND1)
NZ-IND1’s comment might also relate to concerns
posed above regarding regulators’ focus on the political
agenda, rather than public health. If there is a push to
export food and to grow business for economic gain in
NZ, there is a potential for conflict of interest – however,
this is not empirically supported and is in need of further
exploration.
UK industry also noted the importance of an interper-
sonal relationship between industry and regulators, and
the importance of trust. Trust was however identified as
having declined over time:
I think it’s [trust] not as good as it was. I mean in days
gone by the links were a lot closer with the Minister of
Agriculture, as it was then, but a lot of it’s down
to personal contacts and that’s why it’s important
for companies to have people who build those contacts,
that you pick up the phone to people and there’s a level
of trust there. (UK-IND7)
This point was further emphasized by UK-IND3 who
noted that as the result of a change in government, individ-
uals in food regulation no longer communicate with the
food industry:
They had a food policy which was a much more – I
mean they never got to their conclusions but at least
they started the process of a much more comprehensive
food strategy really. This government abandoned all that
and went back to, you know, ‘how do we produce more
and sell more in Britain?’… the previous government
used to hold six monthly discussions with CEOs of food
retailers; this government abandoned that straightaway
and all they wanted to talk to was farmers all the time,
which was fine because actually it means they bother us
less, until of course you get an incident and then they’ve
got no knowledge of how our sector works or our
relationship with consumers and what actually happens
on labels and all these kinds of things. (UK-IND3)
The lack of communication with the food sector may
be in part due to the means by which the role of
regulators is governed. Consistent with comments from
AU industry about the role of government in shaping
the agenda for the food sector, UK-IND3 (industry
food regulator) and UK-IND2 (finance and manage-
ment) comment:
Well I would say our relationship with the officials is
very good… but the ministers are not necessarily
focused on our end of the supply chain. They’re very
politically driven and they’re politically driven towards
farming rather than either manufacturing or retail…
(UK-IND3)
I think certainly government and UK government and
some of the key government departments we’ve got
individual good relationships there but in terms of
how much they listen and respond to not just us but
lots of other organisations in the food and farming
space, so that’s open for debate I think. Certainly we
would say it’s difficult to engage UK government on
lots of these issues. (UK-IND2)
Here it is presented that the interests of the govern-
ment, in this case selling more product within Britain,
needs to be taken into consideration. UK-IND11’s com-
ment emphasises the power of political agendas:
But also you know, there’s huge legal things and
political things because then you know if the
politicians lose the trust in the regulators you know
they’ll end up restructuring the organisation......So
there is a thing where regulators I think are in a very,
very difficult position…(UK-IND11)
UK industry viewed the extent of bureaucracy and the
fragmented information spread amongst stakeholders as
problematic to the functioning of regulation:
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You know, regulators and government, it’s so difficult
to do that and there is that thing of always, you know,
kind of a stereotype civil servant of always passing
things up and down the line endlessly checking not
only the facts but also whether the boss – and the
boss’s boss and maybe the politician’s boss....you know,
making sure everybody’s onside…And I think that one
of the problems with the – certainly in government and
to a certain extent with regulators – is sort of having
somebody who can make that kind of authoritative
statement …But I think that very often the problem is
that they have people in all of the organisations who
can’t really just act on 25% information, you know, they
have to have 95%....you know, and 95% is incredibly
difficult to get. (UK-IND11)
Furthermore, rather that working together, the message
that was conveyed by our interviewees was that there is
animosity and distrust between the politicians, the regula-
tors and the industry. For example:
…the reason why politicians will get involved is
because they will fear that not everybody in the food
industry can be trusted, so that’s why regulation
exists, is to prevent those that don’t play by the rules
or don’t play fair from harming consumers and the
general public. (UK-IND14)
The < name of regulatory body > is, sadly, a hollow
shell of what it once. I mean food safety is all it does
these days so, yes, you would expect the < name of
regulatory body > to be a first port of call and to be
doing something but they’re so emasculated these
days you just think – it was a very, very clever move
by the coalition government to not abolish it in the
bonfire of the [inaudible] because I think there would
have been an outcry and a massive campaign, not
only by our campaigning sector but even some bits of
the food industry wouldn’t have wanted to see it go.
But what they wanted it to be was weaker and it now
is. (UK-IND8)
UK-IND8, responsible for finance and management of
industry, may be speaking to the recent (2010) changes
in England whereby the main regulatory body is no
longer responsible for food authenticity and compos-
ition, and are solely focused on food safety.
Solutions for improving relationships
In order to address many of the potential areas of con-
flict mentioned above, participants voiced a variety of
potential solutions to improve the relationships between
regulators and industry. These included making regula-
tion more flexible and realistic, encouraging information
sharing and mutual education between regulators and
industry, and generally encouraging more positive rela-
tionships through face to face interaction and frequent
communication.
AU-REG respondents noted the need for a degree of
flexibility in regulation, dependent on the industry involved.
The degree of flexibility was identified as industry-specific,
with changes in regulation likely affecting industries differ-
ently. This may be a potential solution to conflict, but one
that needs to be approached with caution, taking into ac-
count the confusion and conflict that can result with incon-
sistency (i.e., differential treatment) and change:
I mean there’s a whole lot to food regulation now and
there’s queries being raised by some whether the type
of regulation, the outcomes based stuff that’s been put
out there, is the best way to go or the prescriptive, or
do you go like an island in the middle [allow some
self-regulation]? The basis for the outcomes based is
– so it gives industry the opportunity to be innovative
and seek the outcome by a different means rather
than traditional means and that’s fine. We’ve really
only got so many businesses that have the capacity to
do that, the majority – 99% – of businesses I’m sure,
food businesses, haven’t got the capacity to be that
innovative with how they comply with food regulation,
so it’s – we’ll see over time whether that evolves. I’m
sure it will but it’ll evolve to something else. There’s
constant change which must be confusing for the
industry. (AU-REG20)
As a solution to conflict between regulators and industry,
AU and NZ regulation participants also discussed
their role in ensuring that the regulations being put
into place are realistic, requiring correspondence with
and input from industry:
We need to make sure that it [regulation] is
achievable by industry. It’s no good putting unrealistic
requirements on industry, so we certainly sign off
with industry that ‘here’s what we need to put in place
and you tell us if you’ve got any concerns or if you
think there’s any impracticalities with it and we’ll
address those’. (AU-REG20)
Government and regulators can have a role helping
the business to comply or knowing what they need to
comply with rather than just setting it and hoping
that they – or expecting that they do what they’re
meant to do. (AU-REG19)
NZ regulator participants discussed the importance of
communication to ensure that industry are able to
understand, and more importantly, implement guidelines:
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Part of having a good regulatory system is being good
at voluntary uptake by industry and for us to have
ways to assist them to do that by having some good
guidance and information available. (NZ-REG6)
The importance of face-to-face interaction was also
noted by state regulator AU-REG15:
I guess business owners and those sort of guys that
are on the front foot, we have more of a collaborative
approach when we work with them, so we’re definitely
friendly, have a nice approach and talk with them and
try and understand their business, their challenges. Being
a smaller community we are quite visible to businesses
so, you know, you pop into a shop and you buy an apple
or you buy a drink or you get something and you have a
chat with them and build a bit of a relationship that way.
(AU-REG15)
AU industry also suggested a need for a relationship
with regulators, and a means by which relationships can
be developed between industry and regulators to facilitate
information sharing. They viewed regulators as a resource:
I believe that it has to be win/win and I think when
you’re building that relationship with them – I find
with the health regulators, if you involve them in your
business they will help you and anyone – I think once
they know that you’re open to listening to them you
build a rapport with them that then they’re willing to
work with you but when you come in and see them as
the enemy - oh my God the health inspector seen as
an enemy - they’re not your enemy. They’re here and
if you’re doing everything right - they’re your friend if
you’re doing everything right and I think this is where
some – I believe in the food industry some people say
‘oh they’re the enemy’. They are not the enemy they
are the supposed industry experts and they’re
sometimes more up to date than the mum and dad
deli or the mum and dad restaurant. They’re more up
to date with what’s going on… I think you have to use
them as a resource rather than – I think they are a
resource to you rather than anything else. (AU-IND9)
The AU industry participants recognised their need to
partner with regulators, particularly in times of food
safety incidents where government is seen as a credible
source of information and arguably the representative of
the food system:
In some cases our opinion is that government is going
to have far more credibility than a commercial
organization. We will always do our best but, you
know, to have a government authority presenting the
facts in some cases is far more credible than a
commercial organization. (AU-IND6)
NZ industry participants spoke about the important
role regulators play in the operation of industry. Dis-
cussing their role in advising on the recall of products,
NZ-IND3 stated:
It was important that as an overarching regulator < name
of regulating body > could provide good advice not only
to the public but also to industry. (NZ-IND3)
The role of advisor is bidirectional, however. Regard-
ing the lack of knowledge regulators have about the food
industry, AU-REG3 (employed by a national food regula-
tory body) posed the solution of information sharing.
We have a good working relationship with the regulators.
We give them information if they ask for it, and
sometimes we give them information if they don’t
ask for it but if we think it helps their position. I
mean I think you need to understand that if the
regulators are not close to the industry, if they
don’t actually understand the industry itself, then
they don’t – you know, they’re restricted in how
effective they can be. (AU-REG3)
In the above quote AU-REG3 reflects the importance
of a relationship between industry and regulators in the
management of risk, with industry playing the role of
educator in some circumstances. The regulators, in this
case, need to work with industry to obtain the correct
information about food safety issues in order to manage
the risks.
In summary, AU and NZ regulator participants
depicted greater understanding of the difficulties faced
by industry in their compliance. This may be the result
of their proximity to industry in the way regulation is
enforced. For example, they discussed being able to meet
face-to-face with industry, and to maintain continuity in
regulatory representatives. As a result, they were able to
suggest means by which barriers to communication and
conflict could be overcome. As reflected by the lack of
representation by UK in the above, UK interviewees did
not discuss potential solutions for overcoming problems
of distrust and lack of communication.
Discussion
Consumers in industrialised countries increasingly
demand foods that are safe and of high quality. This,
alongside the interest of public health and an increas-
ingly globalized food system, has led to the development
of food safety standards [26]. This paper presents the
views of individuals in food regulation (the regulators),
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and those in the food industry (the regulated), regarding
their trust in and communication with one another
within three countries: the UK, New Zealand, and
Australia. Our primary aim was to provide recommen-
dations, from representatives of industry and regulation,
for facilitating the (re)building of trusting and communi-
cative relationships between the two parties, with the
end goal of increasing compliance with regulation and
protecting public health. As an outsider, food safety
standards may be viewed as a set of rules or best prac-
tices, enforced by one or more regulatory body. We may
view industry then as compliant, or noncompliant. How-
ever, as we have shown, there are a variety of factors that
shape the dynamic and complex relationships between
regulators and industry, and the nature or extent of
partial or (non)compliance. It is by speaking with these
actors that we can identify barriers to compliance that
are amenable to change. The following outlines key
barriers and points of conflict identified in the data, with
the primary aim being to propose solutions relevant to
improving regulator-industry communication and trust.
In doing so, we identify that while trust needs to occur
at an interpersonal level between individual actors, trust at
an institutional level also needs to occur. At times, partici-
pant comments were suggestive of a boarder distrust in
either the systems of regulation or industry in general.
While previous research has identified that food safety
regulation is trusted by the community [27], our data
suggest this is not the case for individuals working
within industry. Primarily, there is concern on the part
of some UK and AU interviewees that regulations are
based on larger political agendas or serve the interest of
selected industry (rather than public health). Although
these comments were not consistent across the findings,
they are important nonetheless because they point to the
need for greater transparency in the development and
enforcement of food safety standards, and the need to
develop institutional trust in regulation as a system –
either at a local/state (e.g., department of health) or
national level (e.g., FSA or FSANZ). Furthermore, these
comments suggest a lack of, or breakdown in interper-
sonal trust between industry and regulators; a finding
evident elsewhere in the data. Institutional distrust was
also evident from the perspective of industry who at
times suggested that regulation (rather than individual
regulators) ‘holds’ industry down (e.g., red tape). Inter-
estingly, regulator interviewees were aware of this
perception and AU and NZ participants identified a
need to communicate with industry about their actual
intentions; ensuring public safety and safeguarding busi-
nesses. However, regulators were not always sympathetic
to industry perceptions. There were concerns from regu-
lators that individual industry representatives are at
times purposely noncompliant with regulation, which
reflected badly on industry generally. From the perspective
of regulators, we suggest that interpersonal interactions
with industry have tainted the perception of industry as a
whole; a finding consistent with the theoretical literature
on trust whereby it is argued that that although “the real
repository of trust is in the abstract system, rather than
the individuals who in specific contexts ‘represent’ it…it is
the flesh and blood people (who are potentially fallible)
who are its operators” [28] (p. 85) and who come to repre-
sent the system.
In several interviews from AU and NZ, success stories
were noted, whereby participants discussed the import-
ance of face-to-face communication between industry and
regulators, establishing relationships at the onset of
business development, and creating an environment
where industry can enquire about food safety issues with-
out fear of repercussion. We argue that these may be
viewed as facilitators to the development of interpersonal
trust between regulators and industry representatives,
which based on our discussion above, may in turn have
positive implications for institutional trust. Whilst there
are undoubtedly structural and resource barriers to these
solutions, they are nonetheless feasible in certain circum-
stances. For example, having one individual responsible
for specific areas would allow for continuity in enforce-
ment and the development of the interpersonal relation-
ships and familiarity needed to foster trust [29].
Food safety is a complex issue and it is understandable
that perspectives on how to manage food safety would
differ between practical (industry) and technical (regula-
tors) players. We argue that communication would
facilitate a mutually beneficial understanding of these
perspectives. For example, previous research has identi-
fied that in times of food safety incidents, it is important
for public health professionals to work with the media in
the construction of their reporting to ensure that infor-
mation being disseminated to the public is accurate [30].
The need for information sharing (from industry to
regulator) was identified in our interviews, whereby both
parties indicated that some regulators lack knowledge
about the food system which at times affects their judge-
ment of how to handle food recalls, or their ability to
relate to difficulties in meeting food standards. We sug-
gest that a possible way forward is the inclusion in
course curricula the study of food laws and standards
for Environmental Health degrees, and for individuals in
regulation who have not worked within the food system
in any other capacity.
Most prominent in the findings from both parties were
discussions around barriers to compliance. The per-
ceived differential treatment, difficulty in understanding
regulatory requirements, changing requirements and
overregulation were concerns posed by industry, and
recognised by NZ and AU regulators. Whilst a solution
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proposed by many to address overregulation was flexibility
in enforcement, this may lead to further feelings of differ-
ential treatment and lead to confusion and individual
interpretation of what/how standards should be met. Also
problematic are the barriers to addressing changing
requirements, as they are based on best-practice guide-
lines that are constantly being updated based on emerging
research. However, based on the data from all three
countries, we do recommend that an audit be conducted
of what training, information and support is currently
available to industry so that any recommendations made
from the perceptions of respondents can be grounded in
truth and tailored to complement existing resources.
Furthermore, given the variety of industry (e.g., mom n’
pop stores, large corporations), individual communication
with regulators could allow for adjustments to regulatory
requirements on a case-by-case basis, though again there
is room here to create confusion and conflict.
Also noted in the data is the importance of political
climate and history in shaping how industry and regula-
tors view one-another. Data from the UK were unique
from AU and NZ interviews in that they were indicative
of very poor relations between regulators and industry.
In addition to conflict noted by AU and NZ participants,
UK regulators perceived industry to be reluctant to work
with them, while also noting that they did not see them-
selves as working ‘with’ industry but rather, their role
was that of an enforcer. From an industry perspective,
relationships with regulators lacked communication and
trust. As UK-REG10 noted, this may be a problem
rooted in history. We suspect that the findings are
related to the restructuring of UK food standard govern-
ance over the past 15 years. In 2001, the Food Standards
Agency (FAS) was developed in order to “put an end to
the climate of confusion and suspicion which has re-
sulted from the way food safety and standards issues
have been handled in the past” [31] (p. 6). It was also
created in response to the potential conflict of interest
with the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
(previously responsible for food safety) that arose from
their dual role of protecting the interests of public health
and agriculture and food industries [31]. The FSA was
therefore purposefully developed so that it had institutional
regulation of safety independence from producer interests,
and also separated scientific advice from governmental
departments, giving science a measure of institutional inde-
pendence. These characteristics were deemed to be the
features of an authority that helped to restore public trust
in the UK food system [32]. However, in 2010, food authen-
ticity and composition policy was transferred back to gov-
ernment departments. The UK National Audit Office
(2013) state that this restructuring has led to confusion
amongst food safety stakeholders: “local authorities…con-
tinue to be unclear on whom to contact, or get information
from, in certain areas of food policy. They find that each
department has a different approach and way of working
which requires duplication of effort on their part.” (p. 7) [2].
Our data, consistent with the National Audit Office
accounts, lead us to suggest that the delegation of responsi-
bilities of the FSA be reconsidered. It is difficult to recom-
mend further action given the complexity of bureaucratic
processes. However, perhaps the use of industry advisory
groups to inform the way forward for food standards would
help develop or maintain trust. Furthermore, NZ and AU
regulatory bodies may wish to look to historical blunders in
any future plans for restructure.
Conclusion
Building a strong interdependence between regulators and
industry can balance power relationships, reduce misun-
derstandings, and ensure a reliable flow of information for
both parties [14]. These are all crucial to the development
and maintenance of trust and communicative relation-
ships. Although the issues identified by interviewees differ,
a common theme is the problematic lack of constructive
communication. This points to the complexity of human
relationships and the difficulty in streamlining processes
that are dependent on context, political climate, individual
behaviour, material resources, among other factors.
Ideally, there should be greater communication between
regulators and industry about why specific food standards
are set (e.g., why it is important to have food stored at a
particular temperature and to monitor the temperature).
Furthermore, development of course curricula that
includes increased workplace training for regulators on
food practices would provide regulators with a greater
understanding of the constraints placed on industry in
meeting these regulatory requirements. In an evolving
food safety climate, our paper offers insight into some of
the barriers that shape noncompliance, and points to the
tension and conflict identified between industry and regu-
lators. As identified by participants, many of these
conflicts and barriers may be easy to address with very
few resources. Most central is the need for interpersonal
communication from representatives of both parties. It
clearly benefits public health to have transparent, open
and communicative channels operating between food reg-
ulators and the food industry. We provide these data and
insider suggestions as a means of overcoming conflict.
Endnotes
1Information regarding participant sample characteris-
tics, as outlined in Table 2, have been included when
reporting participant quotes if this information was
deemed useful for the purpose of data interpretation.
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